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Does Private Tutoring Payoff?
*
 
We assess the causal effect of private tutoring on the probability of university placement in 
Turkey. We find that tutoring increases the probability of being placed in a university when 
non-random selection is ignored. Moreover, among those utilizing private tutoring, greater 
expenditure on tutoring is also positively associated with university placement. However, we 
find evidence of positive selection into tutoring, but negative selection into greater 
expenditures among those receiving tutoring. Accounting for this pattern of non-random 
selection, we conclude that private tutoring has a negative causal effect on university 
placement overall, but conditional on receiving any tutoring, spending more on tutoring has a 
positive causal effect on university placement. 
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our own. 1 Introduction
The evolution of private tutoring ￿fee-based tutoring outside the normal school day that provides supple-
mentary instruction to students in academic subjects ￿has proliferated around the world. It became popular
initially in Asia several decades ago, and has since spread to Africa, Europe, and North America (Dang and
Rogers 2008).1 This growth has encountered mixed reactions from policymakers and educational researchers.
First and foremost, it is unclear if private tutoring has a bene￿cial, causal e⁄ect on academic achievement.
Second, if it does, this raises concerns regarding educational equity and limitations on intergenerational
income mobility. Finally, private tutoring, particularly when it is done by teachers outside of school, creates
an incentive for teachers to provide lower quality education within the public school system. In this study,
we exploit a unique database from Turkey to examine the ￿rst and second concerns.
Bray and Kwok (2003) and Bray (1999) review private tutoring schemes across a diverse set of countries.
One stylized fact is that private tutoring is more common in countries with competitive university entrance
examinations (Tansel and Bircan 2006). In many countries, the combination of these high stakes exams
and shortcomings of the educational system (e.g., insu¢ cient supply of universities, large class sizes, and
inadequate public resources) are also mentioned as salient factors underlying the demand for private tutoring
(Tansel and Bircan 2006). Moreover, demand for private tutoring is not solely con￿ned to developing
countries (Bray and Kwok 2003). Here, the poor performance by students on international achievement
tests is given as a contributing factor to the growth in demand.
In Turkey, the government is responsible for providing formal education at all levels, including the
compulsory level (primary and secondary school) and high school.2 There does exist an active private
sector in formal education especially in urban areas. Public and private schools are governed by the Ministry
of Education. Due to a limited supply of tertiary education, a national university entrance exam is required
of all high school graduates to gain access to university education.
The demand for private tutoring in Turkey emanates from the competitive university placement exam-
ination (Tansel and Bircan 2006). There exist three types of private tutoring in Turkey: (i) one-on-one
instruction by a privately paid teacher, (ii) formal courses o⁄ered by teachers after regular school hours,
and (iii) private ￿rms o⁄ering lessons by professional teachers in a classroom setting. Although the ￿rst
and second types are frequently utilized, they are not regulated. The third type is the most common; fa-
cilities of this exist across the country (Tansel and Bircan 2006). Students attend these facilities outside
the regular school day, and they are noted for smaller classes, improved class materials, and more e⁄ective
student-teacher interactions compared to formal schools (Tansel and Bircan 2006).
The number of private tutoring centers has proliferated over the past two decades (Tansel and Bircan
2006). In 1984 there were less than 200 such centers across the country. After a 1984 legal reform recognizing
1Surveys covering the extent of private tutoring in selected countries can be found in Dang (2007a, b) and Dang and Rogers
(2008).
2See Tansel and Bircan (2006) for a detailed review of the educational setup in Turkey. Tansel and Bircan (2008) provide
a detailed account of the history of private tutoring centers.
1these private tutoring centers as part of educational activities, the number of centers quickly grew, reaching
more than 2,000 in 2002 (Private Tutoring Centers Association 2003). For comparison, there were roughly
2,500 high schools in Turkey at the time (Ministry of Education of Turkey 2003).
The average fee charged by private tutoring centers in preparation for the university entrance examination
was approximately $1,300 US dollars in 2002 (Tansel and Bircan 2006). For comparison, per capita income
in Turkey was 2,500 US dollars in 2002. Aggregate tutoring expenditures correspond to 1.44% of GDP, or
$263 million US dollars, and is comparable to total public sector educational spending (Tansel and Bircan
2006).
To understand the determinants of private tutoring, and its impact on university placement, we use
survey data administrated by the Turkish Higher Education Council in 2002 merged with data on actual test
outcomes. More than ten percent of the 1.2 million students taking the 2002 university entrance exam were
required to complete the survey. The survey contains information on demographic attributes, educational
background, and private tutoring. These data allow us to investigate two interesting issues. First, how
e⁄ective is tutoring in gaining university placement? Second, who invests in tutoring?
Our analysis complements several existing studies using data from Turkey and elsewhere. Tansel and
Bircan (2006) analyze expenditures on private tutoring in Turkey utilizing cross-sectional data from 1994.
Kim and Lee (2004) similarly analyze expenditures in South Korea using two data sets from 1997 and 1998.
Tansel and Bircan (2005) utilize the same data set as we do and assess the association between private
tutoring and university placement and test scores in Turkey. The authors conclude that private tutoring is
bene￿cial, but the treatment of tutoring as exogenous is suspect. Kang (2007) assesses the e⁄ect of private
tutoring in South Korea on student academic achievement. The author attempts to circumvent the potential
endogeneity of tutoring using an indicator for ￿rst born status as an instrument. While the instrument is
fairly strong, birth order may directly a⁄ect academic achievement. Nonetheless, the e⁄ect of tutoring is
imprecisely measured and not statistically signi￿cant. Finally, Dang (2007b) uses data from Vietnam in the
1990s to analyze determinants of private tutoring demand and its impact on academic achievement. The
author utilizes the cost of tutoring charged by schools as an exclusion restriction, ￿nding a positive e⁄ect of
tutoring on academic performance.
In light of these previous studies, it is seems prudent to assess the role of non-random selection into
tutoring in Turkey prior to inferring a causal e⁄ect of tutoring in that country. There are several reasons
why we should be concerned about selection on unobservables in the Turkish case. As in South Korea and
Vietnam, students receiving private tutoring may di⁄er along various unobserved, but salient, dimensions
from those who abstain from tutoring. For example, parents who purchase tutoring for their children may
also aid their children￿ s academic success in other ways (e.g., helping with homework). In addition, more
motivated students may be more willing to enroll in private tutoring than their less motivated peers, and this
motivation may translate into better academic performance even absent tutoring. However, the selection
process may also work in the opposite direction. For example, students attending lower quality high schools,
2or who otherwise anticipate not performing well on the university placement exam, may be more willing to
incur the cost of private tutoring.
Unfortunately, however, there does not seem to be any valid exclusion restriction in our data. To proceed,
then, we employ several recently developed parametric and semi-nonparametric techniques from the program
evaluation literature. These techniques allow us to assess the impact of non-random selection on the estimated
treatment e⁄ects obtained under exogeneity. Our results show that non-random selection is an important
issue. First, we ￿nd evidence of positive selection into private tutoring in general, but negative selection into
high expenditure on tutoring. Second, a modest amount of positive selection on unobservables into tutoring is
su¢ cient to explain the positive association between tutoring and university placement; in fact, the treatment
e⁄ect actually becomes negative and statistically signi￿cant. However, the positive association between high
expenditure on tutoring and university placement is robust to the presence of selection on unobservables.
Since it is only high expenditure on tutoring that pays o⁄, our results have signi￿cant rami￿cations for
thinking about the current education system in Turkey, educational equity and intergenerational mobility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical framework and data.
Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirics
2.1 Data
We use a survey administrated by the Turkish Higher Education Council in 2002 to more than ten percent
of the 1.2 million students taking the 2002 university entrance exam. Our sample includes 90,410 students
taking the exam for the ￿rst time. We focus on ￿rst-time test takers since the factors in￿ uencing the
university placement of students taking the exam multiple times may be in￿ uenced by other factors that are
not applicable to ￿rst-time takers.
We use placement to a university after the exam as our measure of academic achievement. We de￿ne
two binary treatment variables. The ￿rst treatment variable, denoted Tutor I, takes on a value of one if
the student receives any private tutoring prior to the exam (zero otherwise). The second treatment variable
￿denoted Tutor II and de￿ned only for the subset of students receiving any private tutoring ￿takes on a
value of one if the student spent more than $1,275 US dollars on private tutoring prior to the exam, and a
value of zero if the student spent less than $1,275 (but more than zero).3 Thus, the ￿rst treatment allows
us to assess the overall impact of private tutoring, while the second treatment allows to assess the impact of
greater expenditure on private tutoring conditional on receiving any tutoring.
To control for parental and environmental factors, we include a number of covariates in the analysis.
Categorical variables are included for the number of siblings, mother￿ s and father￿ s education, family income,
primary and secondary test scores, and city population. In addition, dummy variables are included for gender
3This corresponds to amount greater than 1 Billion Turkish Liras in 2002.
3and internet access.4 We exclude students with missing data for gender. Missing values for the remaining
control variables are imputed (replaced by zero) and imputation dummies are added to the control set.5
Summary statistics are provided in Table 1. In our sample of 90,410 students, 80.1% received private
tutoring. Of these, 46,262 indicated a monetary amount, with 13.1% spending more than $1,275 US dollars.
Given the relatively high percentage of observations with missing data on total expenditures on private
tutoring, one should be concerned with the representativeness of the sample when analyzing the second
treatment. Thus, Table 1 provides separate summary statistics for individuals with Tutor II missing versus
non-missing, as well as the p-values from t-tests of equal means. The results indicate that students with
non-missing data clearly di⁄er in a statistically and economically meaningful way from those with missing
data. For example, students with missing data are much less likely to have internet access and high previous
academic achievement; they are more likely to reside in less a› uent households as measured by income
and parental education, have more siblings, and reside in less populous areas. While we can control for
these regressors in the analysis, it is likely that students with missing data also di⁄er along unobservable
dimensions as well. As such, the results using the Tutor II treatment should be interpreted cautiously. We
shall return to this below.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Parametric Estimation
We begin by specifying the following regression model
yi = I(xi￿ + ￿Di + "i > 0) (1)
where y is a binary measure of observed university placement, x is a vector of controls, D represents one
of the treatments being analyzed, ￿ and ￿ are parameters to be estimated, with ￿ being the parameter
of primary interest, and " is the error term. Probit estimation of (1) yields a consistent estimate of ￿ if,
conditional on x, Cov(D;") = 0 and "i
iid ￿ N(0;1).
Even if the distributional assumption concerning " is correct, it is well known that D and " will not be
independent conditional on x if individuals select into the treatment on the basis of unobservable attributes.
The standard approach to so-called selection on unobservables is to utilize instrumental variables. However,
in the current context, it is unlikely that there are any valid exclusion restrictions in the data. Instead,
we borrow various strategies from the program evaluation literature to assess the sensitivity of our probit
estimates to selection on unobservables. To assess the impact of non-random selection into tutoring, we
4Number of siblings takes values between one and ￿ve, where ￿ve represents ￿more than ￿ve siblings.￿Mother￿ s and father￿ s
education each take values between one (no education) and seven (Master￿ s/Ph.d.), where higher values indicate more education.
Family income takes values between one (lowest) and seven (highest). Primary and secondary school test scores each take values
between one (highest) and four (lowest). Finally, city population takes values between one (smallest) to nine (largest).
5Number of siblings and family income are missing for less than 1% of the sample; primary and secondary test scores are
missing for less than 4% of the sample; mother￿ s and father￿ s education are missing for 6% and 8% of the sample, respectively;
and, population is missing for 8% of the sample.
4employ the bivariate probit model utilized in Altonji et al. (2005, 2008). The model is given by
yi = I(xi￿ + ￿Di + "i > 0) (2)
Di = I(xi￿ + ￿i > 0)
where ￿ is the error term in the treatment assignment equation.
Bivariate probit estimation of (2) yields a consistent estimate of ￿ if, conditional on x, "i;￿i
iid ￿ N2(0;0;1;1;￿).
The correlation coe¢ cient, ￿, captures the correlation between unobservables that impact university place-
ment and the likelihood of receiving the treatment; ￿ > 0 (￿ < 0) implies positive (negative) selection on
unobservables. Aside from the estimate of ￿, estimates of ￿ and ￿ provide information on who receives
private tutoring.
Given the bivariate normality assumption, the model is technically identi￿ed even absent an exclusion
restriction; semi-parametric alternatives require an exclusion restriction. As such, to assess the role of
selection into treatment without formally relying on the distributional assumption, Altonji et al. (2005,
2008) treat the model as underidenti￿ed by one parameter, ￿. Then, the authors constrain ￿ to di⁄erent
values and examine the estimates of the remaining parameters; constraining ￿ to be zero yields estimates
under selection on observables only. We proceed along similar lines.
2.2.2 Semi-Nonparametric Estimation
The preceding estimator requires one to specify a functional form for the outcome equation, as well as
distributions for the error terms. To relax these assumptions, we turn to two related, but distinct, semi-
nonparametric estimation techniques. To understand both techniques, it is useful to explicitly consider the
potential outcomes framework (see, e.g., Neyman 1923; Fisher 1935; Roy 1951; Rubin 1974). Let y1i denote
the potential outcome (i.e., university placement) of student i under the treatment (D = 1); y0i denotes the
potential outcome absent the treatment (D = 0). The student-speci￿c causal e⁄ect of the treatment is given
by the di⁄erence between the corresponding potential outcomes, ￿i = y1i ￿y0i; the average treatment e⁄ect
(ATE) is given by ￿ATE = E[￿i].
For each student, the observed outcome, yi, is equivalent to yi = Diy1i + (1 ￿ Di)y0i. Thus, some
identifying assumptions are needed to circumvent the missing counterfactual problem. Under the conditional
independence assumption (CIA), treatment assignment is assumed to be independent of potential outcomes
conditional on the set of observed covariates, x. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that independence
conditional on x implies independence conditional on the propensity score, p(xi) = Pr(Di = 1jxi).
Two popular classes of propensity score-based estimators of the ATE under the CIA are weighting
estimators and matching estimators.6 Because selection into treatment on the basis of unobservables will
bias estimates of the ATE under either type of estimator, both of the estimation techniques below assess the
6In addition, such estimators also require the common support assumption whereby p(x) 2 (0;1) for all x.
5sensitivity of the estimates obtained under CIA to violations of this assumption. Thus, the logic is identical
to the Altonji et al. (2005, 2008) approach discussed above in the context of parametric estimation.
Minimum Bias Inverse Propensity Score Weighting Our ￿rst estimation approach applies the tech-
nique recently proposed in Millimet and Tchernis (2008), who build on Black and Smith (2004). Intuitively,
the idea is to utilize a weighting estimator applied to a properly chosen sub-set of the original sample in
order to minimize the bias arising from failure of the CIA.























1 ￿ b p(xi)
#
; (3)
where b p(xi) is an estimate of the propensity score (obtain, for example, using a probit model). This estimator
yields an unbiased estimate of ￿ATE under CIA. To examine the bias when CIA fails, assume the following:
(A1) Potential outcomes and latent treatment assignment are additively separable in observables and unob-
servables
y0 = g0(x) + "0
y1 = g1(x) + "1





1 if D￿ > 0
0 otherwise
















Under (A1) and (A2), Millimet and Tchernis (2008) show that the bias of the ATE, conditional on p(x), due


















where p(x) = ￿(h(x)), ￿ = "1 ￿ "0 (i.e., individual-speci￿c, unobserved gains from treatment), and ￿￿u is
the correlation between ￿ and ￿.
To minimize the bias, Millimet and Tchernis (2008) propose to estimate (3) using only observations
6with a propensity score in a neighborhood around p￿, the value of the propensity score that minimizes (4).



























￿ = fijb p(xi) 2 C(p￿)g;
and C(p) denotes a neighborhood around p. We de￿ne C(p￿) as
C(p￿) = fb p(xi)jb p(xi) 2 (p;p)g;
where p = maxf0:02;p￿ ￿ ￿￿g, p = minf0:98;p￿ + ￿￿g, and ￿￿ > 0 is the smallest value such that at
least ￿ percent of both the treatment and control groups are contained in ￿. In the analysis, we set
￿ = 0:01;0:03;0:05, 0:10, and 0:25. For example, if ￿ = 0:01, we ￿nd the smallest value, ￿0:01, such that
1% of the treatment group and 1% of the control group have a propensity score in the interval (p;p). Thus,
smaller values of ￿ should reduce the bias at the expense of higher variance.7
To implement this technique, p￿ must be estimated. The procedure in Millimet and Tchernis (2008) calls
for estimating p￿ assuming (A1), (A2), and functional forms for g0(x), g1(x), and h(x) using the Heckman
















where ￿(￿)=￿(￿) is the inverse Mills￿ratio, ￿ is a mean zero error term, and
￿￿0 = ￿0￿￿0 (7)
￿￿1 = ￿0￿￿0 + ￿￿￿￿￿:
Thus, OLS estimation of (6) after replacing ￿ with an estimate obtained from a ￿rst-stage probit model
yields consistent estimates of ￿0￿￿0 and ￿￿￿￿￿. With these estimates, one can use (4) to obtain an estimate
7We trim observations with propensity scores above (below) 0.98 (0.02), regardless of the value of ￿, to prevent any single
observations from receiving too large of a weight.
7of p￿. Millimet and Tchernis (2008) verify the virtues of this technique even if the functional form and
distributional assumptions underlying the BVN selection model are mis-speci￿ed, and even if CIA holds. A
con￿dence interval for the minimum biased estimate of the ATE is obtained using 200 bootstrap repetitions.
Propensity Score Matching For our ￿nal estimation technique, we estimate the ATE using propensity
score matching along with Rosenbaum bounds (Rosenbaum 2002). While there exist other methods of assess-
ing the sensitivity of PSM estimates to selection on unobservables, Rosenbaum bounds are computationally
attractive and also o⁄er an intuitively appealing measure of the way in which unobservables enter the model
(Ferraro et al. 2007). To implement the matching estimator, we use kernel weighting with the normal kernel
and a ￿xed bandwidth of 0.10. Con￿dence intervals are obtained using 200 bootstrap repetitions.
To understand the Rosenbaum bounds, let ￿i represent the odds of student i receiving the treatment
(i.e., receiving private tutoring); ￿i=(1 ￿ ￿i) is the odds ratio. Assume the log odds ratio can be expressed






= ￿(xi) + ￿￿i (8)








= expf￿(￿i ￿ ￿j)g (9)







If ￿ ￿ expf￿g = 1, as it would in a randomized experiment or in non-experimental data free of bias from
selection on unobservables, the model is said to be free of hidden bias; controlling for selection on observables
would yield an unbiased estimate of the treatment e⁄ect. Higher values of ￿ imply an increasingly important
role of unobservables in the treatment selection process. For example, ￿ = 2 implies that observationally
identical students di⁄er in their relative odds of treatment by a factor of two. Rosenbaum bounds use bounds
on the distribution of Wilcoxen￿ s signed rank statistic under the null of zero treatment e⁄ect using di⁄erent
values of ￿. This leads to bounds on the signi￿cance level of a one-sided test for no treatment e⁄ect.
3 Results
3.1 Bivariate Probit Estimates
Table 2 presents the results obtained from the constrained bivariate probit model; Tables 3 and 4 present
the unconstrained estimates. Panel I in Table 2 and Table 3 contain the results using the ￿rst treatment:
8any tutoring versus no tutoring prior to the exam (denoted Tutor I). Panel II in Table 2 and Table 4 contain
the results using the second treatment: tutoring expenditures of at least $1,275 US dollars versus tutoring
expenditures less than $1,275 US dollars but greater than zero prior to the exam (denoted Tutor II).
When ￿ is constrained to zero, the results correspond to the estimated treatment e⁄ects under selection
on only observables. In this case, we ￿nd a positive and highly statistically signi￿cant association between
both treatments and the probability of university placement (Panel I: b ￿ = 0:282, s.e. = 0:013; Panel II:
b ￿ = 0:248, s.e. = 0:019). The corresponding marginal e⁄ects (ME), evaluated at the mean, are 0.072 and
0.009, respectively. Thus, while association is sizeable from in economic terms for the Tutor I treatment, it
is very modest for the Tutor II treatment.
However, as Tables 3 and 4 indicate, the unconstrained bivariate probit results suggest a sizeable amount
of non-random selection. Interestingly, though, the pattern di⁄ers across the two treatments. In Table
3, we ￿nd strong evidence of positive selection into the Tutor I treatment (b ￿ = 0:373, p = 0:000). Among
students receiving private tutoring, Table 4 reveals evidence of negative selection into the Tutor II treatment
(b ￿ = ￿0:159, p = 0:000). Thus, while unobservables associated with a higher likelihood of university
placement are positively correlated with unobservables determining the use of any private tutoring services,
unobservables associated with a higher likelihood of university placement are negatively correlated with
unobservables determining expenditures on private tutoring services (conditional on positive expenditures).
In other words, there is positive selection into tutoring overall, but among students receiving tutoring, there
is negative selection into high expenditures on tutoring.
Prior to assessing the impact of this selection on our ability to interpret the estimates obtained under
selection on only observables in a causal manner, a brief examination of the remaining coe¢ cient estimates
in Tables 3 and 4 is informative. In terms of explaining treatment assignment, we ￿nd that many of
the variables are highly statistically signi￿cant predictors of both treatments. First, as expected given
our discussion in the Introduction, students from more a› uent households as measured family income,
internet access, parental education, and fewer siblings are more likely to utilize private tutoring. In addition,
conditional on positive expenditures, expenditures are increasing with internet access, mother￿ s education,
and family income. Second, high expenditure on private tutoring (conditional on positive expenditures), and
any tutoring to a lesser extent, are more common in larger, urban environments. Third, females are less
likely to receive any private tutoring. However, conditional on receiving some private tutoring, households
are more likely to spend greater amounts on tutoring for females. Finally, while tutoring and tutoring
expenditures are unrelated to primary school test score, students scoring better on the secondary school test
are more likely to receive tutoring prior to the university placement exam; secondary school test score is
unrelated to expenditures conditional on receiving tutoring. Given these patterns, if private tutoring matters
for university placement, policymakers and researchers ought to be concerned about the equity implications
￿particularly along economic and gender lines ￿of a large-scale tutoring system in Turkey.
Returning now to the constrained bivariate probit results, we assess the implications of varying degrees of
9positive selection into the Tutor I treatment in Panel I of Table 2. While the unconstrained estimates yield an
estimate of b ￿ = 0:373, the constrained results indicate that even a more modest amount of positive selection
on unobservables is su¢ cient to eliminate and even reverse the sign of the treatment e⁄ect. Speci￿cally,
when ￿ = 0:10, the estimated treatment e⁄ect is reduced by over 60% (b ￿ = 0:106, s.e. = 0:013), although the
marginal e⁄ect is unchanged (ME = 0.072). Setting ￿ = 0:20, we ￿nd a negative and statistically signi￿cant
e⁄ect of tutoring on university placement (b ￿ = ￿0:075, s.e. = 0:013; ME = -0.022). In the unconstrained
estimation, ￿ = 0:373 and the treatment e⁄ect falls to -0.397 (s.e. = 0:124); the ME is -0.124. In light of
these results, we conclude that the causal e⁄ect of any tutoring (versus no tutoring at all) is not robust, and
admitting even modest levels of positive selection into tutoring is su¢ cient to conclude that private tutoring
has a negligible or even a deleterious causal e⁄ect on university placement.
Panel II of Table 2 assesses the implications of varying degrees of negative selection into the Tutor II
treatment. Given the positive coe¢ cient obtained when ￿ is constrained to zero, the e⁄ect only becomes
larger when one allows for negative selection. In the unconstrained estimation, ￿ = ￿0:158 and the treatment
e⁄ect rises to 0.532 (s.e. = 0:110), implying a ME of 0.019. Thus, in contrast to Panel I, we ￿nd ￿among
those utilizing private tutoring ￿greater expenditures on tutoring have a positive and robust causal e⁄ect
on university placement, although the magnitude is perhaps not overly large.
Combining the two sets of results, along with the summary statistics, indicates that the majority of
students utilize tutoring, but spend less than $1,275 US dollars. Purchasing relatively low cost or short-term
tutoring, however, at best has no impact on the probability of university placement, and at worst reduces the
probability. However, for the small minority of students who use tutoring more intensively and/or purchase
relatively expensive tutoring, such tutoring improves the probability of university placement. Since students
from wealthy households with well-educated mothers are the primary recipients of large expenditures on
private tutoring, the equity implications discussed previously are magni￿ed. We now turn to the semi-
nonparametric methods to see if this ￿nding continues to hold.
3.2 Propensity Score-Based Estimates
3.2.1 Minimum Biased Weighting Estimates
Table 5 presents the results obtained using the Hirano and Imbens (2001) weighting estimator. In terms of
the ￿rst treatment, Tutor I, the Hirano and Imbens estimator applied to the entire sample indicates that
tutoring is associated with a statistically signi￿cant 10% increase in the probability of university placement
(￿HI = 0:099). However, minimizing the bias by restricting the sample to one percent of the treatment
and control groups around the estimated bias-minimizing propensity score, p￿, of 0.923 increases the point
estimate in contrast to our expectation from the parametric results (￿MB;0:01 = 0:118). However, the e⁄ect
is only marginally statistically signi￿cant as the 90% con￿dence level just excludes zero. While the lack of
statistical signi￿cance may partly re￿ ect the reduction in sample size, the estimation sample still includes
10nearly 2,000 students. Lastly, the Heckman BVN results are consonant with the pattern of selection discussed
previously, although the estimated coe¢ cients on the selection terms are not statistically signi￿cant.
In terms of the second treatment, Tutor II, the Hirano and Imbens estimator applied to the entire
sample indicates that tutoring is associated with a statistically signi￿cant 7% increase in the probability
of university placement (￿HI = 0:072). However, minimizing the bias by restricting the sample to one
percent of the treatment and control groups around the estimated bias-minimizing propensity score of 0.855
increases the estimate (￿MB;0:01 = 0:091), and the e⁄ect remains statistically signi￿cant. In addition, the
Heckman BVN results indicate positive and statistically signi￿cant selection into treatment on the basis
of individual-speci￿c, unobserved gains from treatment, but negative and statistically signi￿cant selection
on the basis of unobservables that a⁄ect university placement absent the treatment. This pattern suggests
that, ceteris paribus, students with a lower probability of university placement absent large expenditures on
private tutoring, but who bene￿t the most from such large expenditures, are more likely to spend a large
amount on tutoring. Overall, the minimum bias approach applied to the Tutor II treatment indicates, as in
the parametric approach, that negative selection overall biases down the estimated treatment e⁄ect.
3.2.2 Matching Estimates
Table 6 presents the ￿nal estimates, obtained utilizing kernel matching and Rosenbaum bounds. Panel I
reveals a statistically signi￿cant, estimated ATE of the Tutor I treatment of 8% (￿ = 0:084), similar to the
point estimate of the weighting estimator obtained under CIA. However, the Rosenbaum bounds reveal the
lack of robustness of this estimate. Under a modest amount of positive selection on unobservables ￿such
that observationally identical students di⁄er in their relative odds of treatment by a factor of roughly 1.5,
we fail to reject the null that the ATE is zero. Panel II reveals a statistically signi￿cant, estimated ATE of
the Tutor II treatment of 9% (￿ = 0:093). Again, this is similar, as expected, to the point estimate of the
weighting estimator obtained under CIA. Since negative selection only serves to strengthen the bene￿cial
e⁄ect of greater spending, conditional on receiving any tutoring, the Rosenbaum bounds are uninformative
in this case; they simply indicate that we continue to reject the null that the ATE is zero as we allow for
increasingly strong negative selection.
3.3 Further Analysis
To assess the robustness of our conclusions, we perform two sets of additional analyses.8 First, we re-visit the
issue of non-random missing data for the Tutor II treatment. Ideally one would have an exclusion restriction
￿a variable impacting the probability of having non-missing data that does not impact the probability of
university placement conditional on the remaining regressors ￿enabling the estimation of Heckman selection
model. However, such a variable is unlikely to exist in our data. Nonetheless, to get an idea of how the
missing data impacts our results, we assume that all students who report utilizing some tutoring, but with
8All results in this section are available upon request.
11missing data on the exact amount spent on tutoring, spent less than $1,275 US dollars. In other words,
we replace missing values for Tutor II with zero. As discussed above, since students with missing data
come from less a› uent households in more rural areas, and these attributes are negatively associated with
expenditures in Table 4, replacing missing values with zero may not be far o⁄ the mark.
Proceeding along these lines, we repeat all of the previous estimations. In the interest of brevity, we simply
summarize the results. First, the bivariate probit results, conditional on ￿, are qualitatively unchanged.
However, the unconstrained bivariate probit model yields b ￿ = ￿0:006 (p = 0:904), indicating a failure to
reject exogeneity. Under the assumption of exogeneity, the treatment e⁄ect is b ￿ = 0:278 (s.e. = 0:019; ME
= 0.005), which is similar to the estimate under exogeneity in Panel II of Table 2.
Second, the semi-nonparametric results replacing missing values of Tutor II with zero are also essentially
unchanged. If anything, the estimates indicate a slightly larger impact of high expenditures on university
placement. In sum, assuming that individuals with missing data spent less than $1,275 US dollars does
not alter our conclusion that high spending on private tutoring has a bene￿cial causal e⁄ect on university
placement conditional on using any tutoring.
Our second set of additional analyses allows the impact of private tutoring to di⁄er along observable
dimensions. Speci￿cally, we repeat the previous analysis ￿of both the Tutor I and Tutor II treatments ￿
for di⁄erent sub-groups of students. First, we split the sample along gender lines. Second, we divided the
sample into those with internet access and those without. Our conclusions regarding the impact of private
tutoring did not qualitatively di⁄er along these dimensions.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the determinants and impacts of private tutoring in Turkey using a unique cross-
sectional survey from 2002. Given our prior belief that selection into tutoring is non-random, but lacking a
valid exclusion restriction, we employ recently developed estimation techniques from the program evaluation
literature that assess the sensitivity of estimates obtained under conditional independence to selection on
unobservables. Our results are striking, and should provide cause for alarm by policymakers already wary of
the burgeoning market for private tutoring. Speci￿cally, we reach three conclusions. First, while the use of
private tutoring is positively associated with university placement, this appears entirely explained by positive
selection. Moreover, allowing for even a modest amount of positive selection on unobservables indicates that,
on average, tutoring actually decreases the probability of university placement. Second, there is a robust,
positive causal e⁄ect of tutoring ￿among those utilizing tutoring ￿on the probability of university placement
if students spend a relatively large amount on tutoring (in excess of $1,275 US dollars). In combination,
then, the results suggest that unless one is willing to invest heavily in private tutoring, one is better o⁄
forsaking any tutoring. Finally, we ￿nd that the present utilization of private tutoring has potentially large
implications on intergenerational income mobility and regional income disparities in Turkey. While tutoring
12in general is extremely prevalent in Turkey, only the a› uent residing in major urban areas are likely to spend
su¢ ciently to reap the rewards.
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15Table 1.  Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD Diff P-value
University Placement 90,410 0.280 0.449 26,124 0.212 0.409 46,262 0.364 0.481 -0.151 0.000
      (1 = Yes)
Tutor I (1 = Yes) 90,410 0.801 0.400 26,124 1.000 0.000 46,262 1.000 0.000
Tutor II (1 = $1,275+  46,262 0.131 0.337   46,262 0.131 0.337
     US dollars, 0 = between $1 
     and $1,275 US dollars)
Female (1 = Yes) 90,410 0.451 0.498 26,124 0.433 0.495 46,262 0.457 0.498 -0.024 0.000
Internet Access (1 = Yes) 90,410 0.379 0.485 26,124 0.300 0.458 46,262 0.467 0.499 -0.167 0.000
Number of Siblings
  Less than or Equal to Two 90,410 0.320 0.467 26,124 0.215 0.411 46,262 0.428 0.495 -0.213 0.000
  Three 90,410 0.266 0.442 26,124 0.259 0.438 46,262 0.275 0.446 -0.015 0.000
  Four 90,410 0.163 0.370 26,124 0.193 0.394 46,262 0.134 0.341 0.059 0.000
  Five or More 90,410 0.249 0.432 26,124 0.330 0.470 46,262 0.163 0.369 0.168 0.000
Mother's Education
  Illiterate 90,410 0.188 0.390 26,124 0.256 0.436 46,262 0.118 0.322 0.138 0.000
  Literate or Primary School 90,410 0.525 0.499 26,124 0.563 0.496 46,262 0.482 0.500 0.080 0.000
  Seconday School 90,410 0.065 0.247 26,124 0.050 0.217 46,262 0.079 0.270 -0.030 0.000
  High School 90,410 0.109 0.312 26,124 0.056 0.229 46,262 0.165 0.371 -0.109 0.000
  Higher Education 90,410 0.055 0.229 26,124 0.020 0.140 46,262 0.094 0.292 -0.074 0.000
Father's Education
  Illiterate 90,410 0.034 0.180 26,124 0.051 0.219 46,262 0.018 0.131 0.033 0.000
  Literate or Primary School 90,410 0.427 0.495 26,124 0.513 0.500 46,262 0.335 0.472 0.177 0.000
  Seconday School 90,410 0.125 0.330 26,124 0.129 0.335 46,262 0.118 0.323 0.010 0.000
  High School 90,410 0.181 0.385 26,124 0.140 0.347 46,262 0.221 0.415 -0.081 0.000
  Higher Education 90,410 0.149 0.356 26,124 0.076 0.265 46,262 0.227 0.419 -0.151 0.000
Primary School Score
  Good (4 out of 4) 90,410 0.715 0.451 26,124 0.624 0.484 46,262 0.800 0.400 -0.176 0.000
  Bad (1,2,3 out of 4) 90,410 0.254 0.435 26,124 0.328 0.470 46,262 0.179 0.383 0.150 0.000
Secondary School Score
  Good (4 out of 4) 90,410 0.235 0.424 26,124 0.165 0.371 46,262 0.303 0.460 -0.138 0.000
  Mediocre (3 out of 4) 90,410 0.450 0.497 26,124 0.444 0.497 46,262 0.449 0.497 -0.006 0.149
  Bad (1 or 2 out of 4) 90,410 0.275 0.447 26,124 0.337 0.473 46,262 0.215 0.411 0.122 0.000
Income (monhly)
  Group 1 (Less than $160) 90,410 0.249 0.432 26,124 0.297 0.457 46,262 0.198 0.398 0.099 0.000
  Group 2 (Between $160 90,410 0.117 0.322 26,124 0.102 0.303 46,262 0.129 0.336 -0.027 0.000
      and $320)
  Group 3 (Between $320 90,410 0.253 0.435 26,124 0.216 0.411 46,262 0.284 0.451 -0.068 0.000
      and $480)
  Group 4 (More than $480) 90,410 0.296 0.457 26,124 0.266 0.442 46,262 0.328 0.469 -0.062 0.000
Population
  Group 1 (Less than 50,000) 90,410 0.385 0.487 26,124 0.486 0.500 46,262 0.270 0.444 0.216 0.000
  Group 2 (Between 50,000 90,410 0.398 0.489 26,124 0.377 0.485 46,262 0.425 0.494 -0.047 0.000
      and 100,000)
  Group 3 (Between 100,000 90,410 0.120 0.325 26,124 0.077 0.267 46,262 0.165 0.371 -0.088 0.000
      and 1,000,000)
  Group 4 (More than 1,000,000) 90,410 0.083 0.275 26,124 0.037 0.190 46,262 0.130 0.336 -0.093 0.000
Full Sample Tutor II Missing Tutor II Non-Missing
Notes:  N = number of observations; SD = standard deviation.  Diff is difference in means across Tutor II missing and non-missing samples; p-value is from corresponding t-test of 
equality of means.Table 2.  Constrained Bivariate Probit Results
Panel I.
ρ = 0.00 ρ = 0.10 ρ = 0.20 ρ = 0.30 ρ = 0.40 ρ = 0.50
  Tutor I  0.282 0.106 -0.075 -0.260 -0.449 -0.643
     (Yes vs. No) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
[0.072] [0.072] [-0.022] [-0.078] [-0.142] [-0.211]
Panel II. ρ = 0.00 ρ = -0.10 ρ = -0.20 ρ = -0.30 ρ = -0.40 ρ = -0.50
  Tutor II  0.248 0.430 0.612 0.793 0.972 1.150
     (More than $1,275 vs. Less than $1,275) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
[0.009] [0.015] [0.021] [0.026] [0.029] [0.033]
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses; marginal effects evaluated at the mean in brackets.
Coefficient
(Standard Error)Table 3.  Unconstrained Bivariate Probit Results: Tutor I Treatment
Coeff S.E. P-value Coeff S.E. P-value
Tutor I (Yes vs. No) -0.397 0.124 0.001
[-0.124]
Female (1 = Yes) -0.050 0.010 0.000 -0.089 0.010 0.000
Internet Access (1 = Yes) 0.160 0.010 0.000 0.139 0.011 0.000
Number of Siblings
  Less than of Equal to Two 0.208 0.117 0.077 -0.099 0.129 0.441
  Three 0.139 0.118 0.236 -0.221 0.129 0.087
  Four 0.072 0.118 0.539 -0.319 0.129 0.013
  Five or More 0.014 0.118 0.904 -0.377 0.129 0.003
Mother's Education
  Illiterate -0.065 0.031 0.036 -0.107 0.031 0.001
  Literate or Primary School 0.015 0.031 0.620 -0.071 0.032 0.024
  Seconday School 0.046 0.035 0.183 -0.019 0.037 0.615
  High School 0.160 0.034 0.000 0.206 0.037 0.000
  Higher Education 0.279 0.037 0.000 0.417 0.050 0.000
Father's Education
  Illiterate -0.052 0.037 0.157 -0.083 0.034 0.015
  Literate or Primary School 0.028 0.026 0.293 -0.106 0.026 0.000
  Seconday School 0.022 0.029 0.452 -0.097 0.029 0.001
  High School 0.059 0.028 0.035 -0.008 0.028 0.777
  Higher Education 0.219 0.029 0.000 0.172 0.032 0.000
Primary School Score
  Good (4 out of 4) 0.345 0.044 0.000 0.053 0.047 0.257
  Bad (1,2,3 out of 4) 0.144 0.045 0.001 -0.034 0.047 0.468
Secondary School Score
  Good (4 out of 4) 0.282 0.038 0.000 0.114 0.044 0.009
  Mediocre (3 out of 4) -0.092 0.038 0.015 -0.086 0.043 0.044
  Bad (1 or 2 out of 4) -0.195 0.038 0.000 -0.195 0.043 0.000
Income (monhly)
  Group 1 (Less than $160) 0.031 0.041 0.441 -0.213 0.041 0.000
  Group 2 (Between $160 and $320) 0.089 0.040 0.028 -0.026 0.041 0.533
  Group 3  (Between $320 and $480) 0.146 0.042 0.000 0.116 0.044 0.008
  Group 4 (More than $480) 0.272 0.043 0.000 0.291 0.047 0.000
Population
  Group 1 (Less than 50,000) 0.116 0.020 0.000 -0.059 0.019 0.002
  Group 2 (Between 50,000 and 100,000) 0.199 0.022 0.000 0.087 0.022 0.000
  Group 3 (Between 100,000 and 1,000,000) 0.209 0.019 0.000 0.085 0.019 0.000
  Group 4 (More than 1,000,000) 0.326 0.019 0.000 -0.032 0.019 0.093
ρ
Number of Observations
Note: Tutor I treatment is one for students utilizing any private tutoring, zero otherwise.  Marginal effect for treatment 
effect in brackets.
0.373 [p = 0.000]
90,410
Outcome Treatment AssignmentTable 4.  Unconstrained Bivariate Probit Results: Tutor II Treatment
Coeff S.E. P-value Coeff S.E. P-value
Tutor II ($1,275+ vs. < $1,275) 0.532 0.110 0.000
[0.019]
Female (1 = Yes) -0.042 0.013 0.001 0.067 0.017 0.000
Internet Access (1 = Yes) 0.103 0.013 0.000 0.160 0.017 0.000
Number of Siblings
  Less than of Equal to Two 0.104 0.171 0.542 -0.071 0.214 0.739
  Three 0.079 0.171 0.642 -0.242 0.214 0.260
  Four 0.048 0.171 0.779 -0.310 0.215 0.150
  Five or More -0.038 0.171 0.823 -0.207 0.215 0.337
Mother's Education
  Illiterate -0.037 0.045 0.412 -0.183 0.064 0.004
  Literate or Primary School 0.033 0.044 0.454 -0.184 0.060 0.002
  Seconday School 0.014 0.048 0.777 -0.103 0.065 0.114
  High School 0.079 0.046 0.086 0.072 0.062 0.245
  Higher Education 0.176 0.049 0.000 0.135 0.064 0.035
Father's Education
  Illiterate -0.023 0.062 0.710 0.103 0.093 0.272
  Literate or Primary School 0.040 0.039 0.310 -0.002 0.055 0.976
  Seconday School 0.032 0.042 0.445 -0.021 0.059 0.720
  High School 0.044 0.040 0.278 0.061 0.056 0.280
  Higher Education 0.178 0.041 0.000 0.041 0.057 0.473
Primary School Score
  Good (4 out of 4) 0.359 0.062 0.000 0.074 0.079 0.347
  Bad (1,2,3 out of 4) 0.172 0.064 0.007 0.002 0.082 0.982
Secondary School Score
  Good (4 out of 4) 0.241 0.050 0.000 -0.102 0.063 0.104
  Mediocre (3 out of 4) -0.117 0.049 0.018 -0.021 0.062 0.732
  Bad (1 or 2 out of 4) -0.251 0.050 0.000 0.036 0.064 0.567
Income (monhly)
  Group 1 (Less than $160) 0.129 0.062 0.039 -0.496 0.075 0.000
  Group 2 (Between $160 and $320) 0.106 0.062 0.086 -0.316 0.073 0.000
  Group 3  (Between $320 and $480) 0.083 0.063 0.182 0.021 0.074 0.777
  Group 4 (More than $480) 0.120 0.067 0.075 0.565 0.074 0.000
Population
  Group 1 (Less than 50,000) 0.154 0.030 0.000 -0.147 0.040 0.000
  Group 2 (Between 50,000 and 100,000) 0.194 0.031 0.000 -0.205 0.043 0.000
  Group 3 (Between 100,000 and 1,000,000) 0.193 0.029 0.000 -0.099 0.037 0.008
  Group 4 (More than 1,000,000) 0.318 0.029 0.000 0.269 0.036 0.000
ρ
Number of Observations 46,262
Outcome Treatment Assignment
-0.159 [p = 0.000]
Note: Tutor II treatment is one for students utilizing more than $1,275 US dollars of private tutoring, zero otherwise.  
Sample is restricted to those utilizing private tutoring.  Marginal effect for treatment effect in brackets.Table 5.  Minimum Bias Propensity Score Results 
Tutor I Tutor II
(Yes vs. No) ($1,275+ vs. < $1,275)
τHI 0.099 0.072
 [  0.091,   0.106] [  0.057,   0.087]
τMB,0.25 0.141 0.113
 [  0.036,   0.144] [  0.091,   0.125]
τMB,0.10 0.148 0.108
 [  0.023,   0.153] [  0.084,   0.125]
τMB,0.05 0.159 0.110
 [  0.019,   0.165] [  0.085,   0.137]
τMB,0.03 0.167 0.126
 [  0.017,   0.161] [  0.085,   0.154]
τMB,0.01 0.118 0.091
 [  0.000,   0.178] [  0.029,   0.135]
ρ0σ0 0.075 -0.132
 [ -0.681,   0.852] [ -0.271,  -0.005]
ρδσδ 0.183 0.905
 [ -0.631,   0.949] [  0.303,   1.459]
p* 0.923 0.855
 [  0.078,   0.975] [  0.624,   0.980]
Notes: 90% empirical confidence intervals obtained using 200 bootstrap repetitions.  HI = Hirano and Imbens 
(2001) normalized estimator; MB = minimum biased estimator using θ = 0.25, 0.10, 0.05, 0.03, or 0.01.  p* = bias-
minimizing propensity score.Table 6.  Propensity Score (Kernel) Matching Estimates and Rosenbaum Bounds
ATE Γ = 1 Γ = 1.2 Γ = 1.4 Γ = 1.6 Γ = 1.8 Γ = 2 Γ = 2.5 Γ = 3
Panel I.
  Tutor I  0.084  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.948  p = 1.000  p = 1.000  p = 1.000  p = 1.000
     (Yes vs. No)  [0.073, 0.095]
Panel II.
  Tutor II  0.093  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 1.000  p = 1.000  p = 1.000  p = 1.000  p = 1.000
     ($1,275+ vs. < $1,275) [0.075, 0.112]
Notes: Matching estimates utilize the normal kernel with a fixed bandwidth of 0.10.  90% empirical confidence intervals obtained using 200 bootstrap repetitions.